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SrRATEGIC FORWM #8, SEPTEMBER 1994 Vaurope and the United States, both inside NATO defense budgets and forces are being significantly and bilaterally. CFSP is intended to address all cut. Europe's military capabilities outside of matters related to EU security. The development NATO will be very limited for a long time. of a CDP could ultimately lead ti a common
The challenge is that ESDI and U.S. involveEuropean defense capability. ment in Europe's security now have to be forged Workshop participants noted that the security into a new, more balanced relationship. As a character of Europe will be affected not only by result, NATO-WEU relations will likely come to the deepening of cooperation and integration in the fore of U.S. security. European participants pointed out, strongly at times, that there are major differences between The U.S. Commitment to Europe
Europe and the Japan model on which the Amendment was based. Among the differences Europeans in recent years appear to have less noted were the European's majority contribution confidence in the credibility of the U.S.
to NATO infrastructure funds, the larger forces commitment to Europe's security. This may have maintained by major European states, and the been exacerbated by a series of successively active roles they played in operations beyond lowered U.S. force levels in Europe, which have NATO such as in the Gulf War and the former often been accompanied by rancorous debate in Yugoslavia. Washington and have been revised even further Several U.S. analysts foresaw a reasonable downward before reductions were completed.
likelihood that only a small, symbolic U.S. A U.S. force of approximately 100,000 will military presence will remain in Europe by the provide an Army corps headquarters, portions of end of the decade. Yet U.S. forces in Europe are the corps' support troops and 2 two-brigade shifting from a focus on deterrence to being divisions of ground troops; 2.3 wing equivalents of heavily engaged in support of operations outside air power; naval support forces ashore; and an of the NATO area. U.S. political polls indicate the adequate array of bases and logistical assets for country remains torn between the burdens of reconstitution of a larger force should it be world leadership and the promise of isolationism. required.
Some Europeans seem to be shifting their focus from the numbers of U.S. troops to some other indication (preferably in the form of hard Europeans at the workshop were evidence) of a commitment to Europe's security. In discussing regional roles and relationships States has a responsibility to do so. NATO would of the UN, CSCE, NATO and WEU, some benefit from innovative policies as well as participants envisaged a framework for dealing practical techniques, such as computer links and with crises that involved UN negotiations, CSCE more integrated analytical capabilities, fact finding, and NATO to carry out UN/CSCE The circumstances in which the United States requests for peace operations. When direct U.S. will act militarily in a European crisis pose a involvement was not appropriate, the WEU, using continuing question, as does the issue of when the a CJTF, might carry out peace operations. Europeans will act militarily. Except for the case Discussants also addressed the idea of of an attack on a member state of NATO, both the establishing a steering group comprised of larger United States and the Europeans are likely to states to take the lead in developing approaches follow strategies of selective engagement, where and solutions to important security issues. Many the criteria for action are not determined in believed a steering group would be essential for advance and full consensus is less certain, timely, effective development of policy direction.
dismayed that members of Congress

